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The Trade Union Act 2016, the European Court of Human Rights and the ‘right 
to strike’ under Article 11 of the European Convention.1 
Introduction 
Article 11(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights provides that ‘Everyone 
has the right ... to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and 
to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.’ Article 11 case law holds that 
protection extends beyond a mere right to join a trade union but also encompasses a 
number of freedoms including a right of a trade union to make representations to an 
employer on behalf of the membership2; a right for trade union members not to be 
discriminated against by an employer3 and a right to engage in collective bargaining4. 
The Strasbourg Court has also now formally accepted that a ‘right to strike’ is within 
the scope of trade union rights under Article 11.5 
Legal action at the European Court of Human Rights challenging the United 
Kingdom’s strike law as contrary to Convention rights, has however, so far yielded 
scant satisfaction for trade unions. The Strasbourg Court has failed to directly 
adjudicate on this question, arguably due to an inflexible application of the 
admissibility criteria, or has not effectively applied Convention principles to the 
United Kingdom legal framework – acknowledged to be the most restrictive on strike 
action in Europe.6  For example, in NURMT v United Kingdom7 (RMT v United 
Kingdom), the admissibility criteria was used in order to strike out a claim that the 
balloting requirements (that a union must follow prior to taking industrial action) were 
incompatible with Article 11. The union (after earlier strike action had been subject to 
an injunction) had eventually complied with the strict balloting rules and had 
successfully called the industrial action. The Court held that as the union had been 
able to take action, the application was ‘manifestly ill-founded’ pursuant to Article 
35(1)(b) - as it did not demonstrate a potential violation of Convention rights. The 
Court failed to take into account that the delay (caused by having to comply again 
with the detailed balloting provisions) adversely impacted on the union’s campaign 
and that the union incurred additional substantial financial costs - both examples of 
interference with the ‘right to strike’ guaranteed by Article 11. 8 
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A failure to comply with procedural criteria was also the cause of rejected 
applications in Roffey v United Kingdom9 and Prison Officers’ Association and others 
v United Kingdom (POA v United Kingdom).10 In POA v United Kingdom a claim that 
an outright ban on strike action by prison officers’ was in breach of Article 11 was 
rejected on the basis that a similar complaint had been submitted in 2004 by the 
POA to the International Labour Organisation’s (ILO) Freedom of Association 
Committee alleging the ban was a breach of ILO Convention 87. Article 35(2)(b) of 
the European Convention provides that an application to the European Court that is 
substantially the same as an earlier claim submitted to a different competent judicial 
international body for adjudication is inadmissible unless there is new relevant 
information – such as where there are new parties affected by the restriction. The 
complaint failed on these grounds even though the new applicants were not parties 
to the original ILO application and were directly affected by the measure as individual 
union members and employees. The Strasbourg Court took the view that, as they 
were also local (unpaid) officials, they were sufficiently closely associated with the 
earlier proceedings through their trade union links – despite the fact that the ILO 
action was of a purely collective nature, taken solely by the union many years 
earlier.11  
In Roffey v United Kingdom12 the union initiated industrial action in April 2010. The 
employers responded by penalising those on strike with a loss of non-contractual 
discretionary travel privileges. The union lodged a claim in December 2010 that the 
state’s failure to provide a remedy for the imposition of sanctions short of dismissal 
(the loss of travel benefits) during an industrial dispute constituted an unjustified 
violation of Article 11.The European Court found the application inadmissible on the 
grounds that the application was out of time – it was made after the 6 month time 
limit contained in Article 34(1) - which runs from when the date of the interference 
with Convention rights occurred. The Strasbourg Court determined that this was from 
the date when the applicants were informed of the withdrawal of their travel benefits, 
in April 2010, at the beginning of the main industrial action. The Court failed to take 
into account that the violation was not a one off event but a continuing interference, 
with the travel benefits not being restored until after the settlement of the dispute in 
July 2011.13 
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Where an application overcomes these procedural hurdles the European Court has 
not always applied Convention principles consistently to prima facie evidence of 
violations of Article 11.  In RMT v United Kingdom14 the Court had declared that 
although Article 11 did encompass a right to strike, an absolute ban on secondary 
action was within the state’s ‘margin of appreciation’ and therefore a ‘proportionate’ 
restriction even though there was little evidence to justify such an extensive ban and 
it was not in conformity with European labour standards or with instruments of 
relevant international labour law. 15  
This rather sorry recent record of Strasbourg adjudication on United Kingdom strike 
law has emboldened the Conservative administration to argue that the additional 
limitations on industrial action introduced by the Trade Union Act 2016 are in full 
compliance with Convention standards.16  This statute further complicates the 
balloting procedure a union must undertake prior to taking strike action by, for 
example, introducing new stringent turnout requirements and by imposing additional 
restrictions on peaceful picketing; all provisions that are, prima facie, in violation of 
Article 11(1). Under Article 11(2) the ‘right to strike’ may be restricted where it is “... 
necessary in a democratic society ... for the protection of the rights and freedoms of 
others’. The terminology ‘...necessary in a democratic society’ has been interpreted 
to imply that intervention can only be permitted under Article 11(2) if it meets a 
“pressing social need” – which involves a balancing of competing interests and an 
examination as to whether the state’s intervention goes no further than is necessary 
to meet that need – i.e. it is a proportionate response to the legitimate objective 
pursued.17 This test is met if the new restrictions are a balanced, measured and 
proportionate means of securing the policy objectives behind the legislation. As the 
provisions of the Trade Union Act 2016 plainly interfere with a trade union’s right to 
take industrial action under Article 11(1), it is arguable that significant reasons would 
therefore need to be established to justify these measures.  
The picketing provisions. 
An enduring feature of strike action is that those who are engaged in such action will 
seek to persuade others to support them or join them so as to enhance the 
effectiveness of the strike. As picketing inevitably conflicts with the interests of other 
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parties (such as employers, working employees, and where there is disruption to 
public order, members of the public) picketing has always been subject to control by 
the criminal and civil law. Criminal charges can be brought against pickets, for 
example, relating to obstruction of the highway or offences under the Public Order 
Act 1986 (relating to disorder on a picket) or under s 241 Trade Union and Labour 
Relations Consolidation Act 1992 (TULR(C)A 1992) (relating to intimidation and 
other miscellaneous offences). Civil liability may follow where the pickets are 
trespassing or committing a nuisance. The undue application of existing criminal and 
civil restrictions may well have implications for compliance with the requirements of 
Article 10 (on freedom of speech) as well as Article 11 of the Convention.18 
Of particular relevance to industrial action is the tort of inducing breach of contract, 
which occurs when picketing successfully discourages workers from attending their 
place of work in breach of their employment contract. Picketing may also interfere 
with commercial contracts, where, for example, lorry drivers’ are persuaded not to 
deliver to the employer; resulting in a breach of a commercial contract of supply 
between the supplier of goods and the employer who is the target of the action. 
Trade unions and individual pickets only have immunity from these civil actions if 
they comply with the conditions outlined in s.220 TULR(C)A 1992 – that the picketing 
relates to a ‘trade dispute’ and the pickets attend ‘at or near’ their workplace in order 
to peacefully communicate or obtain information or persuade others not to work.  
Section 10 of the Trade Union Act 2016 strengthens these conditions by inserting a 
new s.220A into the 1992 Act, introducing several new provisions pickets and unions 
must meet before the immunity applies. A union must now appoint a ‘picket 
supervisor’19 who has responsibility for managing the picket line; with the functions of 
the supervisor outlined in the re-issued Picketing Code of Practice.20 The union must 
take reasonable steps to ensure the police are informed of the supervisor’s name 
and contact details and location of the picket line.21 The picket supervisor (who must 
be an official or member of the union) should be present at the picket line or be 
readily contactable by the police or union to attend the picket at short notice and be 
in possession of a letter from the union confirming that the picketing is approved by 
the union.22 A picket supervisor is under a duty to show the relevant employer or 
their agent the letter on request ‘as soon as reasonably practicable’.23 When 
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attending the picket the supervisor must wear ‘something’ (such as a badge or 
armband) so that they are readily identifiable.24 
Should there be a failure to comply with any of these conditions then the protection 
of the immunities against tort action, for the union and for individual pickets, will be 
withdrawn. Thus, for example, if a picket supervisor is not available or if the letter of 
authorisation has been mislaid, or if the picket supervisor has forgotten to wear the 
‘official’ armband, the picket will be deemed to be automatically unlawful. The legal 
consequences of which is an injunction being granted to stop the picketing and a 
subsequent damages claim. Some of the conditions may be particularly difficult for 
unions to follow – the larger the workplace and the greater the number of entrances 
and exits the more supervisors will be required. It is highly unlikely that any union 
could meet such demands solely through their full time officials. In such 
circumstances a union may need to recruit ordinary members who, if they are not 
familiar with the law and the Code of Practice and are not able to be present or to be 
nearby at all times, may well inadvertently violate the provisions of the statute.  It is 
clear that the new conditions constrain the freedom of workers and trade unions to 
organise and participate in peaceful picketing and the likely impact of these new 
rules will be further injunctions being granted for relatively trivial reasons. 
In order to ascertain if these provisions are in violation of Article 11(2) safeguards the 
question to be addressed is – are they a balanced, measured and proportionate 
means of securing the government’s objectives? The underlying policy objectives 
(identified in the Consultation papers published prior to the passage of the statute 
through Parliament) make it clear that the picket supervisors’ role is to encourage 
responsible behaviour on the picket line and deter intimidatory and violent conduct in 
order to safeguard the rights of workers, management and members of the public.25 
Yet, there is little substantive evidence of disorderly picketing,26 there is already a 
whole range of criminal and civil law actions available to the state or the employer to 
control unruly picketing and, as noted earlier, picketing has to be peaceful for a union 
to enjoy the benefit of the immunities. Academic research has also demonstrated 
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there is little need for this level of control. Over a 10 year period from 2005 to 2015, 
only 5 applications were made for injunctions in relation to breaches of the picketing 
provisions of s 220 TULR(C)A 1992. 27  
It is clear that the Government has not balanced the rights of both parties when 
introducing these restrictions; the protection of the immunities will be withdrawn no 
matter how minor the breach and without regard to whether the employer has 
suffered economic injury or been prejudiced in any way. The consequences for trade 
unions and their members, however, is not just the inability to picket but also that 
individual pickets will also lose their protection from unfair dismissal.28 These harsh 
penalties for a failure of complying with an organisational regulation (such as 
forgetting to wear an armband or misplacing a letter of authorisation) offend against 
the notion of ‘proportionality’ inherent in the requirements of Article 11(2) and 
Strasbourg case law.  
One aspect of the proportionality test outlined in Strasbourg case law is whether the 
domestic law is consistent with the requirements of relevant international law and 
contemporary European practice. Legislation that is in violation of international and 
European standards cannot be said to be ‘proportionate’.29 The International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and European Social Charter (ESC) supervisory bodies 
recognise that the right to picket is an inherent part of the ‘right to strike’ and any 
unreasonable interference is a violation of ILO Convention 87, Article 3 and ESC 
Article 6(4).30 As the new restrictions impose disproportionate and discriminatory 
obligations on trade unions and extensive regulation of picketing it is unlikely that 
these provisions will be in compliance with ILO and ESC standards. 
As there is no clear ‘pressing social need’ for these new restrictions; as they are 
disproportionate; and as there has been no attempt to balance the interests of the 
relevant parties it is doubtful the government could establish a justification for these 
picketing initiatives. These provisions will simply hinder the organisation of legitimate 
picketing by trade unions and furnish employers with further opportunities to limit 
picketing in industrial disputes. In short, the picketing requirements in the Trade 
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Union Act 2016, by imposing this level of state supervision of picketing without 
appropriate justification are likely to be in violation of Article 11. 
The balloting provisions. 
A trade union when taking lawful industrial action has to comply with existing detailed 
and complex procedures relating to the conduct and organisation of an industrial 
action ballot and to the content of any subsequent strike notice.31 Without full 
compliance with all the balloting procedures any strike is unlawful and an injunction 
may be granted prohibiting the industrial action. The provisions of the Trade Union 
Act 2016 builds on this existing structure of regulation. Section 2 of the Trade Union 
Act (inserting a new s.226(2)(a)(iia) into the TULR(C)A 1992) introduces a new 
minimum turnout requirement when a trade union is balloting for industrial action. At 
least 50% of union members eligible to vote must participate in the ballot, and of 
those that participate, a majority of those voting support the call for action. The 
Government’s view is that this would enhance the democratic process; that it will 
ensure that ‘... industrial action has democratic support and legitimacy within the 
relevant workforce’32 and ‘... avoid great disruption on very old ballots secured by low 
turnouts’.33   
In the United Kingdom, across all national and municipal elections, an accepted 
principle is that a simple majority of those who voted is sufficient for a democratic 
mandate. The Government has, however, persistently refused, despite requests from 
trade unions, to countenance a switch from inefficient postal ballots (that historically 
produce low turnouts) to secure workplace ballots or electronic balloting – both 
systems that would be far more likely to yield higher levels of member participation 
and so guarantee a more democratic decision than an arbitrary minimum turnout 
condition that will, in practice, be very difficult to achieve.34 This failure to introduce 
alternative and less restrictive voting methods has implications for the issue of 
proportionality as other methods of fulfilling the aim of strengthening the democratic 
legitimacy of a ballot could have been applied.35 
Research has demonstrated that this new provision will have a very serious impact 
on the ability of trade unions to take action in support of collective bargaining – an 
essential element of trade union rights under Article 11. In the period of investigation, 
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between 1997 and 2015, if the 50% criteria was in place, only 85 out of 158 strike 
ballots would have reached this threshold – a total of 3.3 million workers would have 
been denied the opportunity to take strike action.36  The Government’s own analysts 
have predicted a 65% reduction in industrial action stoppages. 37 This provision 
satisfies the stated objective of ensuring that industrial action has a very high level of 
democratic validity - nevertheless, in the context of its effect on trade union ability to 
defend the legitimate interests of their membership, it is doubtful whether this can be 
justified as a sufficiently balanced and proportionate constraint, particularly as 
alternative and less damaging voting methods could have been applied to meet the 
objective of strengthening the democratic legitimacy of the ballot. 
In ‘important public services’ (including the fire service, education (of those under 17) 
and health services, and the transport, border security and nuclear decommissioning 
sectors38) there is an additional requirement that industrial action will require the 
support of at least 40% of those entitled to vote.39 A simple majority (that satisfies the 
new 50% participation threshold) will not be sufficient in order for action to go ahead 
in these particular industries and any union member who abstains or forgets to return 
their ballot paper will effectively be deemed to be opposing the strike.  
The consequences of requiring a trade union to meet both the 50% threshold and 
the 40% minimum level of support for public sector disputes will have a serious 
impact on a trade union’s capability in the public services to call for action - one of 
the few sectors where unions remain strong. It will compromise a trade union’s ability 
to organise and prosecute lawful industrial action in order to protect centralised 
collective bargaining and weaken trade union opposition to the erosion of pay and 
conditions that are often the corollary to cuts in public services. The Government’s 
justification for this measure is predominantly an argument based on the 
inconvenience strikes in the public sector cause to the general public.40 However, it 
is not clear there has been any attempt to balance the competing interests as 
required under Strasbourg principles – a degree of disruption to the public is often 
unavoidable and temporary, yet the impact of enforcing these provisions on trade 
unions, essentially undermining a trade union’s bargaining position, are potentially 
grave.  
It is also the case that any restriction on trade unions operating in the public sector 
must still be justified as proportionate in the context of the facts. In Demir and 
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Bayakara v Turkey,41 (Demir) a case on restrictions on collective bargaining in the 
public sector, the Grand Chamber stated that such constraints on civil servants ‘must 
not impair the very essence of the right to organise’ and must ‘ … not be arbitrarily 
imposed’.42 As noted earlier, the decisions of relevant international institutions 
outlining minimum labour standards are also relevant when determining the 
legitimacy of restrictions. The ILO Freedom of Association Committee has explicitly 
held that the requirement that at least 50% of relevant employees in a dispute must 
turn out to vote in a ballot, is an ‘excessive’ and ‘unjustified’ requirement that hinders 
the right to strike.43 The ILO Committee of Experts has also condemned a 
requirement that over 50% of voters must approve a strike in a ballot as an 
‘unreasonable’ requirement and inconsistent with ILO Convention 87.44 The 
Government has attempted to justify the new balloting regulations in the public 
sector by arguing that the impact of strike action on public services justifies the 
additional controls.45 The ILO does permit states to introduce a higher voting 
threshold in very limited circumstances – where the strike action is in ‘essential 
services’.46 The list of ‘important services’ in the Trade Union Act 2016 includes 
services (such as education and transport) that do not fall within the ILO definition of 
‘essential services’ and therefore should not be restricted in this way.47  
Article 6(4) of the European Social Charter48 establishes the right of workers to take 
collective action subject to the qualification contained in Article 31 – a restriction has 
to be ‘necessary in a democratic society’ for the ‘protection of the rights and 
freedoms of others’.49 By reference to this test, the supervisory bodies of the 
European Social Charter have repeatedly been of the view that the detailed balloting 
requirements in UK law is not in conformity with Article 6(4) – due to their technical 
and complex nature.50 It is therefore highly likely that the additional balloting 
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provisions in the Trade Union Act will also be denounced as a violation of Article 
6(4).  
In addition to the threshold criteria the Trade Union Act introduces further regulation 
of balloting procedure. For example, section 5 (2C) and (2D) also stipulates that 
where unions ask for support for action short of a strike, details of the actual type of 
action will need to be included on the ballot paper and that the ballot paper must 
specify the anticipated length of the industrial action. The designated purpose of this 
is to enable a trade union member to make an informed decision when deciding how 
to vote. Employers are, however, also entitled to receive a copy of the ballot paper in 
advance simply for the purpose of determining whether the union has complied with 
these (and existing) requirements and then, where there is an error, to seek an 
injunction to stay industrial action. The failure of the union to meet these detailed 
requirements will not cause the employer any practical disadvantage or 
inconvenience, and as they are obligations designed to protect the interests of 
members, not employers, it must be questioned whether, as an unnecessary 
requirement, they are compliant with the principles underpinning Article 11(2). 
Section 231 and 231A of the TULR(C)A 1992 already obliges trade unions to 
provide, to all those members entitled to vote and relevant employers, detailed 
information about the number of votes cast; the number who voted yes; the number 
voted no and the number of spoiled ballots. Section 6 of the 2016 Act (amending 
s.231 TULR(C)A 1992) now additionally requires trade unions to additionally specify 
how many members were entitled to vote and whether the new minimum thresholds 
have been met. A legislative requirement to inform the electorate of the result in 
broad terms may well be justifiable but compelling the union to inform their 
membership of the result of the ballot in such detail (with any failure resulting in 
injunctive relief) arguably goes beyond what is required to satisfy the democratic 
objective of the provision. 
The Government’s consistent argument in the consultation documentation and whilst 
the Bill was proceeding through its parliamentary stages was that these constraints 
on industrial action are necessary in order to protect businesses, the economy and 
to avoid undue public inconvenience. Yet, the whole purpose of industrial action is to 
put economic pressure on employers in order to encourage settlement of the dispute 
and, at times, a degree of disruption to the public is an unavoidable and natural 
consequence of the enforcement of this right under Article 11. Disruption to a 
business is not, on its own, a sufficient reason to unduly limit strike action as a trade 
union’s right to strike and so cause economic damage – in order to protect their 
members’ interests by forcing the employer to comply with a collective agreement – 
took precedence over the employer’s competing right to refuse to join the employers’ 
association and engage in collective bargaining.51 Furthermore, the argument based 
on the damage strike action causes to the economy and to the general public, is 
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the past 25 years but has most recently has shown a decline – for example, from 
1.04m in 2007 to 170,000 in 2015.52 
 
Conclusions 
Under Convention principles it is self-evident that a government must act in good 
faith when devising and implementing any restrictions on a Convention right. If the 
motive for restrictions impacting on a Convention right is ill-intentioned then the state 
will clearly be in violation of the relevant Article. The Grand Chamber in Demir53 re-
iterated this point when noting that the reasons introduced by the national authorities 
to justify the restrictions must be ‘ …relevant and sufficient’.54 The succession of 
additional hurdles (to taking lawful industrial action) introduced by the Trade Union 
Act 2016 suggests that the provisions may be more motivated by an ideological 
hostility to the trade union movement than a genuine attempt to improve industrial 
relations or economic efficiency; a motivation that the Strasbourg Court should take 
into account when assessing the validity of the aims of the legislation. 
It is also relevant to note that in Demir55 the Grand Chamber of the European Court 
not only referred to international labour standards (and associated jurisprudence) 
when determining the extent of Article 11 rights and the disproportionality of the 
Turkish law but also the legal consensus amongst contracting states to the 
Convention. The provisions of the Trade Union Act 2016 have developed controls on 
picketing and balloting far beyond regulatory requirements in Europe. Some 
regulation over picketing and balloting is not unusual prior to industrial action, but no 
member of the Council of Europe regulates these industrial activities to such an 
extent as the United Kingdom. 
For a challenge to these provisions in the Trade Union Act 2016 to succeed at 
Strasbourg may depend on the European Court’s current attitude to the ‘margin of 
appreciation’ doctrine. In RMT v United Kingdom56  the Strasbourg Court was willing 
to give the United Kingdom a wide ‘margin of appreciation’ (the discretion states 
have in determining national law in areas of political or social sensitivity) when 
determining that a total ban on secondary action was not in violation of Article 11. 
The Strasbourg Court classified secondary industrial action as an ‘accessory’ activity 
rather than a ‘core’ aspect of trade union freedom of association and held that if a 
restriction affects only an accessory aspect of trade union freedom, a wider margin 
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of appreciation is permitted to signatory states when assessing whether the 
interference can be justified under Article 11(2).57 On this hierarchal classification of 
strike action it is arguable a ‘core’ trade union activity such as primary strike action 
and associated picketing should attract a much narrower margin of appreciation than 
‘accessory’ secondary action.  
It is undeniable, however, that the decision in RMT v United Kingdom58 reflected a 
cautious attitude to the interpretation of Article 11; mirroring a recent trend across the 
Convention of affording states a wide margin of appreciation in ‘sensitive’ policy 
areas. 59  An alternative view is that the Court’s ruling in RMT v United Kingdom60 is 
an aberration; interrupting a more progressive line of case law that have applied 
Convention doctrines to labour law violations in a more consistent and purposive 
manner. There have been a number of decisions at Strasbourg (not involving the 
United Kingdom) that have endorsed the understanding in Demir61 and Enerji Yapi-
Yol Sen v Turkey62 that strike action should be protected as an significant aspect of 
Article 11 and that any restrictions should therefore be construed strictly.63 
Furthermore, the Strasbourg Court in Unite v United Kingdom64 referred to the Grand 
Chamber’s judgment in Demir65, when confirming that the application of the ‘margin 
of appreciation’ may be restricted in appropriate circumstances. Although the Court 
arguably failed to apply established Convention principles to the individual facts of 
the case (for possible ‘political’ reasons, considered below) the Court did endorse 
the view that the breadth of the margin of appreciation depends on the nature and 
extent of the right and the applicable restrictions, the strength of the competing 
interests and the state’s compliance with international instruments and the European 
consensus. By reference to these guidelines a contemporary challenge to the 
industrial action provisions of the Trade Union Act 2016 should be more likely to be 
successful - taking into account that the Strasbourg Court has unequivocally 
accepted Article 11 protects the ‘right to strike’, that the relevant ‘margin of 
appreciation’ should be of a limited nature and that the Trade Union Act has 
significantly increased the level of interference - making it more difficult for the state 
to justify the provisions. 
One major potential obstacle to an action at Strasbourg is the claim that the 
European court has failed in recent years to examine cases involving the United 
Kingdom in a vigorous and consistent manner; aided by the absence of a system of 
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judicial precedent. Ewing and Hendy66 have argued robustly that that the several 
unsuccessful Strasbourg cases, noted earlier in this paper, have created a de facto 
United Kingdom ‘opt out’ of Convention protection for labour law violations; the Court 
has ‘… closed its doors to the British worker and their unions’.67 Although, in the 
United Kingdom context, persistent judicial, political and media criticism of ‘activism’ 
in the European Court have had a malign influence on decision making at 
Strasbourg, if these judgments (such as RMT v United Kingdom68) are perceived in 
the future as an attempt at appeasing United Kingdom critics of the Strasbourg court 
this should weaken their authority and influence. 
It remains to be seen whether the observations by the Strasbourg Court in RMT v 
United Kingdom,69 and in other United Kingdom cases, are used as a justification to 
reject the argument that the industrial action provisions in the Trade Union Act are in 
violation of Article 11. An optimist may point to the existing Strasbourg case law, 
noted earlier (in decisions concerning other signatory states), that re-state and apply 
relevant and expansive Convention principles on the nature and scope of Article 11 
rights in a more forceful and apt manner. Furthermore, it may be the case that the 
European court will revert to a more critical and considered analysis of United 
Kingdom labour law once it becomes clear that their emollient decision making has 
had little or no impact on political or media criticism in the United Kingdom of the 
Strasbourg process. If the criticism of European institutions generally becomes more 
strident as a consequence of conflict over the ‘Brexit’ negotiations the Court may 
come to this conclusion sooner, rather than later.  
As a result of recent experience at Strasbourg trade unions may well have become 
more reluctant to litigate at Strasbourg. Although a ‘test case strategy’ is a 
dangerous course of action (as each failure can be used by government as a 
vindication of its legal policy) it may only be a matter of time before the European 
Court of Human Rights return to the principles stemming from cases such as 
Demir70. When that happens the considered judgment of the Strasbourg Court is 
likely to be that the balloting and picketing provisions in the Trade Union Act 2016 
are incompatible with the Convention and in violation of Article 11 safeguards. 
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